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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLES D. KENT, ] 
Grievant/Petitioner, ; 
vs. ; 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT ] 
SECURITY, and the ; 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD ] 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Agency/Respondents. ] 
i BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
i Case No. 92-0676 CA 
i 10 CSRB/H.O. 138 (Step 
, 4 CSRB 40 (Step 
5) 
6) 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE CAREER 
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, CASE NUMBER 10 CSRB/H.O. 138 
(Step 5), 4 CSRB 40 (Step 6). 
I. 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended) 
confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court or other 
appellate Courts, as provided by statute, to review all final 
agency actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1953, as amended) grants 
jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals to review the final 
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orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of State agencies. This appeal is from a formal 
adjudicative proceeding conducted by the Career Service Review 
Board. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the Career Service Review Board (herein CSRB) 
abuse its discretion by affirming the Department's reliance on 
"professional standards" as a basis for discipline, when the 
"professional standards" were never formally adopted by the 
Department, were not in writing and were not disseminated to 
employees? 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of general law and is 
to be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the 
agency's decision. Savage Industries v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
2. Did the Career Service Review Board abuse its 
discretion in determining a nexus existed between Kent's off-
duty misconduct and his employment when the misconduct did not 
violate any specific Departmental policies and which occurred 
five (5) years prior to the disciplinary action? 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of general law and is 
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to be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the 
agency's decision. Id. 
3. Did the Career Service Review Board abuse its 
discretion in holding that Kent may be terminated from his 
existing position for misconduct that occurred while he 
occupied a different position with the Department? 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of general law and is 
to be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the 
agency's decision. Id. 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the 
case on appeal and each of the following are set forth 
verbatim in the Addendum submitted herewith: 
a. Utah Code Anno. 67-19-18 (1953, as amended). 
b. Utah Code Anno. 77-5-1 (1953, as amended). 
c. Utah Administrative Code, Rule 468-11-1(1), 
d. Utah Administrative Code, Rule 468-11-2(1). 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. CASE NATURE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION 
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Kent was hired by the Department as an Accountant in 
1984. He was subsequently promoted and became a Field 
Auditor. Kent's employment with the Department was 
terminated on December 6, 1991, by virtue of a written 
decision issued by the head of the Department, Floyd Astin. 
Kent appealed his dismissal to the Career Service Review 
Board and the CSRB Administrator appointed Sherrie Guyon as 
the Step 5 Formal Hearing Officer. A hearing was held before 
Ms. Guyon on February 7, 1992, and she issued her Decision 
affirming Kent's dismissal from employment on March 31, 1992. 
Kent appealed to the CSRB, which adopted Ms. Guyon's Findings 
of Fact and affirmed her Decision in total. 
Kent appeals from the Decision of the Step 5 Hearing 
Officer and the CSRB upholding his dismissal from employment 
with the Department. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All citations will be to the transcript of the Step 5 
evidentiary hearing and Exhibits received therein. 
Charles Kent (Kent) was hired by the Department of 
Employment Security (the Department) on October 9, 1984. as an 
Accountant, Grade 17. Kent was hired in a non-career service 
position known as time limited salary, which means Kent was 
simply hired on a conrractual/at-wiil basis. T.13, lines 14-
4 
25. Kent was promoted to Accountant, Grade 19, on April 22, 
1985. T.19, lines 5-6. On January 13, 1986, Kent's employee 
status was changed from at-will to career service status, 
which gave Kent certain vested rights. T.16, lines 11-12. On 
October 6, 1986, Kent was promoted, this time to Accountant, 
Grade 21. T.19, lines 9-10. In January of 1989, Kent applied 
for the position of Field Auditor, Grade 21, and he was 
selected for the position. T.28, lines 1-15, T.106, lines 18-
22. Kent's position was thereafter reclassified as a Field 
Auditor II, Grade 25. T.18, lines 16-20. In March of 1990, 
Kent was transferred from the Salt Lake City office to the 
Clearfield office of the Department where he worked in 
handling claims and placement. Kent transferred back to the 
Field Auditor position in the Salt Lake City office in July, 
1990. This transfer was not disciplinary in nature but was 
the result of budget difficulties within the Department. 
T.20, lines 3-8; T.35, lines 10-18; T.107, lines 1-14. Kent 
continued in the Field Auditor position at the Salt Lake City 
office until he was disciplined. 
On May 1, 1991, Kent was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury 
wherein he faced ten (10) felony charges for allegedly 
fraudulently endorsing ten (10) Social Security checks made 
out to his deceased father * Exhibit G-l. At the time Kent 
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was indicted, one Dean Kimber was the Chief of Contributions, 
which was the section of the Department where Kent was 
employed. Don Avery became Chief of Contributions in August 
of 1991, just prior to the time Kent appeared in Federal Court 
on the foregoing charges. T.54, lines 7-19. Prior to being 
promoted to Chief of Contributions, Mr. Avery also knew that 
Kent had a scheduled Court appearance in the fall. T.47, 
lines 7-13. Mr. Avery also occupied the position of Field 
Audit Manager (prior to his promotion), which is a mid-level 
supervisory position between Kent and the Chief of 
Contributions. T.27, lines 12-24. 
Kent testified he specifically told Dean Kimber that he 
(Kent) had an August 8, 1991, Court date. T.lll, lines 10-15. 
On August 8, 1991, Petitioner pled guilty to one (1) 
misdemeanor charge of forging an endorsement on a treasury 
check and the ten (10) felony charges were dismissed. Exhibit 
G-3. The foregoing crime occurred in the 1985-86 timeframe 
according to Mr. Avery. T.57, lines 12-14. 
The Department had actual knowledge of Kent's Court date 
of August 8th inasmuch as Evan Mattinson (Supervisor cf 
Investigations for the Department) had called Don Avery 
beforehand and advised him of the same. T.55, lines 12-16. 
In fact, Mr. Mattinson instructed an individual named Vincent 
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Iturbe to attend Mr. Kent's hearing. T.55, lines 17-25. 
After entering his plea, Kent had a moment to talk with 
Mr. Iturbe and Mr. Iturbe told Kent that "he (Mr. Iturbe) was 
going to prepare a report, he'd take care of it." T.112, 
lines 24-15; T.113, line 1. It was because of this discussion 
that Kent did not advise Don Avery of the plea. T.113, lines 
2-4. Kent and Don Avery thereafter met and discussed the 
plea. As a result of this discussion, Don Avery wrote to his 
superior on September 13, and stated: 
"He [Kent] still contends to be innocent 
and the only reason he pleaded guilty was 
upon the advice of his attorney. His 
attorney counseled him that pleading 
guilty to a misdemeanor should have no 
consequences upon his current 
employment." Grievant's Exhibit 2. 
On October 4, 1991, the Department issued a Notice of 
Intent to discipline in which it asserted the legal authority 
for the discipline was as follows: 
"You are advised of this disciplinary 
action 'to advance the good of the public 
interest' [Utah Code 67-19-18(1)], R468-
11-1.3(a), and pursuant to the following 
under R468-11-1 for noncompliance with 
professional standards adopted by this 
Department." Department Exhibit 3. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Kent filed an appeal to Floyd Astin, Administrator of the 
Department, who framed the issue as follows: 
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"The issue in this matter is whether you should 
be dismissed from the Department and state 
service to advance the good of the public 
interest for noncompliance with professional 
standards adopted by this Department. -
Specifically- should you be dismissed for 
having been convicted of a crime of moral 
turpitude while employed by this Department?" 
(Emphasis supplied). Department Exhibit 1. 
In fact, the only "professional standards" relied upon by 
the Department are those contained in the Supervisor's 
Handbook, The pertinent portions of that Handbook are set 
forth in the Addendum. Moreover, Mr. Astin testified that 
professional standards are based on "my judgment." He 
stated: 
"There is just certain conduct in my 
judgment;, certain conduct that employees 
are expected to follow and it's JUST: 
understood. In human relationships, yoa 
just don't do certain things. You don't 
have to spell them ail out." T.82, lines 
9-13. 
Kent was never given a copy of the Supervisor's 
Handbook, because it "is not distributed to anyone below 
management level," T.59, lines 18-19, and Kent testified he 
was unaware of the provision therein concerning dismissal for 
conviction of a crime. T.106, lines 3-6. 
It is undisputed that Petitioner had no prior 
disciplinary history and his performance evaluations were 
successful or superior. 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I; The Department has the burden of proving the 
legal bases for imposing discipline. The Department sought 
to discipline Kent for violation of professional standards 
adopted b;/ it. The Department never proved, however, that: any 
objective, identifiable standards exist nor that Kent was ever 
made aware of the same. The Department therefore failed to 
carry its burden and Kent should be reinstated with back pay. 
POINT II: The DeSpain decision of this Court requires 
state agencies to prove a nexus between off-duty misconduct 
and violation of specific policies. The Agency never 
presented any evidence of specific policies but the Hearing 
Officer and the CSRB ignored this requirement by finding a 
notion of "general11 policies. The Hearing Officer and the 
CSRB therefore abused its discretion by failing to find the 
proper nexus. Kent also asserts DeSpain should be modified to 
add a time limit of one (1) year in which management can 
impose discipline from the date of misconduct. 
POINT III: U.C.A. 67-19-18 sets forth numerous types of 
misconduct that may constitute a basis for discipline. The 
statute ends, however, with the phrase "in office." Kent 
maintains this phrase should be interpreted to mean 
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misconduct while occupying a given position, Kent maintains 
that because he held a different position when the misconduct 




THE DEPARTMENT NEVER CARRIED ITS BURDEN OF 
PROVING KENT VIOLATED PROFESSIONAL 
STANDARDS BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT NEVER 
PROVED IT HAD ADOPTED PROFESSIONAL 
STANDARDS. 
Don Avery testified that he prepared the "Notification of 
Intent to DisciplineM (Department Exhibit 3), which provides: 
"You are advised of this disciplinary-
action 'to advance the good of the public 
interest' [Utah Code 67-19-18(1)], R.468-
11-1.3(3), and pursuant to the following 
under R.268-11-1 for noncompliance with 
professional standards adopted by this 
Department." (Emphasis supplied). 
The notification clearly asserts that professional 
standards had been "adopted by this Department" and suggests a 
written document that a person could simply examine. The 
difficulty, however, is that the only documentation concerning 
"professional standards" is, purportedly, located in the 
Supervisor's Handbook, T.58, lines 5-8, and that document is 
not distributed to employees, T.59, lines 18-19. Moreover, 
the Department's Handbook does not expressly set forth any 
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item called "professional standards" but simply provides as 
follows: 
"Dismissals for Cause. 
Failure to satisfactorily complete 
probation period. 
Failure to report to work. 
Conviction of a crime involving moral 
turpitude. 
Negligence, inefficiency or unfitness to 
perform duties. 
Violation of Department or State 
regulations. 
Gross misconduct or insubordination." 
See Page 12-2 of Supervisor's Handbook set 
forth in the Addendum. 
Mr. Astin's decision to dismiss Kent relies specifically 
on the Supervisor's Handbook and counsel for the Department 
asserted Kent's conviction as the grounds for dismissal in 
opening argument at the Step 5 hearing: 
"We feel that: the decision is correct and 
ask that it be affirmed on the grounds 
that the conduct that Mr. Kent engaged in 
and his subsequent conviction by way of 
the guilty plea to that conduct has made 
him, bluntly and simply put, unfit to 
perform the duties for which he was 
originally hired and for which he was last 
employed." (Emphasis supplied). T.9, 
lines 6-12. 
Mr. Astin, however, changed his position in the Step 5 
hearing by asserting that "professional standards" has some 
generic meaning: 
"Q. All right. Can you tell me how I can 
get my hands on those professional 
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standards? Where are they? 
A, I think it's just my judgment. It's 
common knowledge that you don't have 
people working for you that are convicted 
of falsifying records when you have them 
going on and checking whether or not 
employers are doing that sort of thing. 
That's a standard that I think would be 
understood by anybody that did that type 
of work, whether it's written or not.'1 
(Emphasis supplied). T.80, lines 14-24. 
The Step 5 Hearing Officer accepted this notion of a 
generalized set of professional standards: 
"Grievant asserted that there were no 
specific rules of professional conduct 
delineated in the Department's rules and 
regulations and that, therefore, it was an 
error for the Department to cite the 
violation of professional policies as a 
reason for discipline. The Administrator 
testified, however, that he feels there is 
certain professional conduct that is 
"understood" in general by employees in 
positions such as Grievant's. It seems to 
be generally understood that an employee's 
reputation for honesty and trustworthiness 
must be without question. This is 
especially true in a sensitive position 
such as Grievant's when trust fund moneys 
are involved. Decision of Step 5 Hearing 
Officer at page 6. 
Intriguingly, the CSRB (in its Step 6 Decision; admitted 
the Supervisor's Handbook does not constitute professional 
standards but instead chose to adopt a "new basis for 
disciplining Kent - violation of work place policies:" 
"4. The Department's Supervisor Handbook 
lists as a cause for dismissal: 
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"Conviction of a crime involving moral 
turpitude." (Grvt. Exh. 1; Agency Exh. 4) 
Appellant, who was not a supervisor or 
manager, had not received a copy of the 
handbook during his years of employment 
with the Department. Appellant averred 
that he had no knowledge of these 
professional standards prior to dismissal 
proceedings (T.105). Admittedly, this 
handbook does not apply the term 
"professional standards," but it 
explicitly sets forth several grounds as 
dismissal for cause, including a 
conviction for a crime of moral 
turpitude, Human Resource Management 
Rules (July 1991 edition), at R.468-11-1, 
states in part: "Noncompliance with these 
rules, departmental safety policies, 
professional standards adopted by a 
department, work place policies, ... 
failure to advance the good of the public 
interest shall be cause for disciplinary 
action," (Emphasis in original). This 
provision of the Human Resource Management 
Rules is appiicabJe to all career service 
employees, including Kent, regardless of 
v/hether one has personal knowledge of the 
rule or not. There are certain moral 
standards, such as integrity, 
trustworthiness, and honesty, which need 
not be written into an employer's policies 
and work place rules. The public 
employing agency may reasonably expect 
adherence to such unwritten universal 
moral standards, which if breached, would 
substantially tarnish an employee's 
reputation and strain if not rupture the 
employment relationship." (Emphasis 
supplied). CSRB Decision at page 9. See 
Addendum. 
Thus, Kent was originally disciplined for violation of 
professional standards purportedly contained in the 
Supervisor's Handbook. When that angle did not work, the 
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Department attempted to "re-shuffle" the deck by asserting 
that there exists some set of professional standards that 
exist in Mr. Astin's mind. The CSRB (sua sponte) then took 
this charade one step further, saying we have a different 
basis for affirming Kent's dismissal - work place policies. 
What does all this mean? It means simply that the 
Department has not carried its burden of proof, by 
substantial evidence, that professional standards ever 
existed! Kent obviously could not have violated standards 
that did not exist and the Department's attempt to discipline 
Kent is void. 
IL 
THE DEPARTMENT HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING A 
NEXUS BETWEEN THE MISCONDUCT AND 
GRIEVANT'S JOB DUTIES. 
In Utah Dept. of Corrections v. DeSpain, 824 P.2d 439 
(Utah App. 1991), this Court held there must be nexus between 
off-duty misconduct and the ability to perform job duties in 
order to sustain a termination. The Court stated: 
"Courts often find a nexus between off-
duty conduct and job performance, 
particularly where the position requires 
high morals, control, and discipline and 
the off-duty conduct is in violation of 
specific employment policies." DeSpain, 
at 444. 
This Court thus required proof of two (2) elements in 
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order to demonstrate nexus, to-wit: 1) the position must 
involve high morals, and 2) the off-duty conduct violates 
specific policies. Kent asserts that neither the Hearing 
Officer or the CSRB addressed the second element of DeSpain's 
nexus request. The Step 5 Hearing Officer's Decision 
regarding the nexus issue asserts: 
"The Agency provided the necessary link 
between Grievant's actions and the 
necessity to discipline him for them, by 
showing that Grievant's failure to 
communicate during the indictment process, 
in addition to the guilty plea, both 
contributed to the Agency's loss of 
confidence in Grievant and to the loss of 
Grievant's credibility to function as an 
effective employee in this sensitive 
position requiring unquestioned 
trustworthiness and honesty. The Hearing 
Officer finds rhat the Agency carried its 
burden by providing substantial evidence 
to show that a nexus existed between 
Grievant's actions on the job and off the 
job, and his ability to function in his 
position." Step 5 Decision at page 7. 
The CSRB conducted no analysis of the nexus issue other 
than stating that the Hearing Officer had given adequate 
consideration to "the nexus between Kent's off-duty misconduct 
and its detrimental relationship -co his employment status, 
..." See Step 6 Decision, Conclusion of Law 9, at page 11. 
Thus, we must examine the Step 5 Decision to determine whether 
it complies with DeSpain. 
The second element of the DeSpain nexus requirement had 
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two (2) components. First, the employee must have engaged in 
off-duty misconduct. That misconduct is easily identifiable 
in that the Department was focused on Kent's misdemeanor 
conviction. Secondly, the misconduct must violate specific 
policies. It is at this point that we encounter difficulties 
in this case because there is no evidence that a specific 
departmental policy was violated. 
The Department attempted to comply with this specific 
policy requirement by asserting that the professional 
standards contained in the Supervisor's Handbook provides for 
dismissal for a conviction involving a crime involving moral 
turpitude. The difficulty with the Department's position is 
that the Supervisor's Handbook "is not distributed to anyone 
below management level," T.59, lines 18-19, and the Department 
did not present any evidence to demonstrate the contents of 
the Supervisor's Handbook constituted professional standards 
or policies governing employee conduct. 
Moreover, the Administrator, Floyd Astin, specifically 
testified that the Department disseminates all policies to 
employees, to-wit: 
"Q. Okay. Tell me how the Department 
adopts a policy. 
A. We look to guidance, of course, from 
the state department, state personnel 
department as to things that they would 
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consider grounds for dismissal, to 
decisions, to suggestions from legal 
counsel, suggestions from personnel 
matters, and matters that may have 
occurred or may have a repetitious nature 
that we feel that employees maybe need to 
be specifically notified of, then we'd 
bring the matter to what we call our 
executive committee composed of a number 
of directors in our Department, we review 
those, and then based upon those reviewsf 
we do recommend that they become a part of 
the handbook. 
Q. Okay. Now, when you adopt a policy, 
do you disseminate that policy to all 
employees? 
A. All employees receive a copy of that, 
yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Or at least have it available to 
them." T.89, lines 2-21. 
Mr, Astin did not know, however, whether the inforraation 
concerning dismissal for a criminal conviction had actually 
been given to employees: 
"Q. Now, under this Dismissals for Cause 
provision, you have, "conviction of a 
crime involving moral turpitude," which is 
what you cited in your decision? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Can you tell me when that policy was 
adopted and disseminated to employees that 
that is a basis for dismissal? 
A. To my knowledge, this goes sack many 
years. I don't — I'm not aware of any — 
any dates on that. 
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Q. So can you tell me with certainty 
whether or not that information is 
actually conveyed to each employee? 
A. Each employee is made aware when they 
come — employee evaluation when they 
first come to the Department that this 
information is available as to what 
standards are in employee handbooks and 
supervisor handbooks. Employee handbooks 
are given to all employees and supervisor 
handbooks are given to all supervisors 
for review by an employee. 
Q. Do you know if this provision en 
Dismissals for Cause is in tne Employee 
Handbook? 
A. I couldn't state for certain at this 
point. My assumption would be that it 
would be, but I just don't know." T.90, 
lines 6-25 and T*91, lines 3-7. 
The Department thus presented no evidence that any policy 
had been adopted, nor that Kent knew of the policy. To the 
contrary, Kent's unrebutted testimony was that he was not 
aware of any policy concerning convictions. T.106, lines 3-6. 
The Department thus did not prove a nexus between Kent's off-
duty conduct and his employment and his dismissal cannot 
stand. 
Additionally, Kent asserts that DeSpain should be 
modified to add a third element, to-wit: the misconduct must 
have occurred within a reasonable time period prior to the 
disciplinary action. Kent believes a reasonable time period 
would start one (1) year prior to any disciplinary action. 
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Kent asserts this temporal requirement is necessary for 
several reasons. First, such a nexus requirement would given 
substantive meaning to the Min office" language found in 
U.C.A. 67-19-18(1). If the Department and the CSRB are 
correct that 'in office" means in employment, then a nexus 
time requirement would give the phrase substantive meaning. 
To hold otherwise would be simply to ignore the "in office" 
language. 
Secondly, the time requirement gives some notion of 
finality/a bright-line test that management and employees 
alike can rely on in making disciplinary decisions. 
And finally, imposing a one (1) year time limitation is 
fundamentally fair. Currently, an employee is required to 
file a grievance no later than one (1) year after the event 
occurs. See, U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5)(b) (1953, as amended). If 
an employee has a beef with management, he/she has a year in 
which to file a grievance. Why should the street not go both 
ways? 
In any event, Kent asserts that misconduct that predates 
disciplinary action by five (5) years does not and cannot meet 
the nexus requirements of DeSpain. 
19 
III. 
KENT CANNOT BE DISCIPLINED FOR CONDUCT 
THAT OCCURRED PRIOR TO HIS APPOINTMENT AS 
A FIELD AUDITOR. 
At the Step 5 evidentiary hearing, Kent argued that he 
could not be disciplined while a field auditor for misconduct 
that occurred when he was an accountant. The Step 5 hearing 
Officer did not address this issue but the CSRB held (at Step 
6) that the term "in office" should be interpreted to mean "an 
employee's full term of service, sequentially and 
continuously." See Step 6 Decision at page 7. Kent disagrees 
with the CSRB's interpretation of U.C.A. 67-19-18, (1953, as 
amended), which provides that dismissal may occur "for such 
just causes as inefficiency, ... or non-feasance in office." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Kent submits the phrase "in office" limits the 
discretion of the Department to terminate an employee by 
statutorily requiring that a "just cause" have occurred 
concurrent with the position being occupied by the employee at 
the time of termination. Thus, Kent submits that he cannot be 
terminated from his Field Auditor position for conduct that 
occurred while he occupied the Accountant's position. 
Moreover, Kent maintains his interpretation is consistent with 
the Legislature's intent because the Supreme Court incerpreted 
20 
a statute containing similar language in such fashion. 
In State v. Bowen, 620 P.2d 72 (Utah 1980), the defendant 
was elected to the Weber County Commission in 1978 and assumed 
his duties in January of 1979. Thereafter, criminal 
proceedings were commenced against the newly elected 
commissioner and he was convicted of thirty two (32) counts of 
having obtained unemployment benefits by false 
representations. 
Proceedings were then instituted to have Mr. Bowen 
removed from his position for violating the then existing 
version of U.C.A. 77-5-1 (1953), which provided for 
impeachment "upon being convicted of... a misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude or malfeasance in office." Id. 
(emphasis supplied). The trial court dismissed the removal 
proceedings on the basis that the false representations did 
not occur during Commissioner Bowen's term, but in fact, 
predated his assumption of duties. The Supreme Court 
affirmed: 
"There is a definite conflict in authority 
on this question. We think it is implicit 
from the above constitutional and 
statutory provisions that the offense must 
occur while the person is serving in the 
office from which it is sought to remove 
him. This also seems to be the great 
weight of authority." (Citations 
omitted). Bowen, at 74. 
21 
While Bowen admittedly deals with an elected official. 
Kent asserts the case is persuasive for three (3) reasons. 
First, the "in office" language found in U.C.A* 67-19-13 is 
identical to the "in office" language interpreted in Bowen. 
Since Commissioner Bowen could not be removed for criminal 
conduct that did not occur "in office/' Kent likewise should 
not be removed for any alleged misconduct that did not occur 
"in office" as a fiela auditor. FurLhet, it is undisputed 
that Kent was not a field auditor in 1985-86 when the crimes 
occurred and therefore submits he was not "in office" within 
the meaning of U.C.A. 67-19-18. 
Secondly, the Legislature is presumed to have intended 
the "in office" language of U.C.A. 67-19-18 would be 
interpreted consistent with Bowen inasmuch as that statute 
has been amended on several occasions (most recently in 1991), 
since the Bowen decision was issued in 1980. See, Amax 
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission - 796 P.2d 1256 
(Utah 1990) (it is presumed Legislature chooses its words 
carefully and advisedly). Had the Legislature intended "in 
office" to mean "in employment" (as held by the CSRB), the 
Legislature has had ample opportunity to change the statute to 
reflect that intent. That the Legislature has not amended the 
statute infers that the Bowen interpretation is acceptable to 
22 
them. 
Thirdly, the Bowen analysis should apply because other 
courts have interpreted the phrase "in office" is limited to 
those circumstances where current criminal misconduct is 
relevant to current duties. The New Mexico Supreme Court had 
occasion to address such a situation in the case of State v. 
Santillanes, 654 P.2d 542 (N.M. 1982). 
As in Bowen, the State of New Mexico, in Santillanes, 
was attempting to remove a County Commissioner for misconduct 
that occurred prior to his current term of office. 
Commissioner Santillanes, however, was in his second term of 
office as Bernalillo County Commissioner and the corruption 
had occurred during his first term. Prior to trial, 
Commissioner Santillanes sought and obtained an order in 
limine from the trial court precluding the presentation of any 
evidence concerning corruption during his first term. The 
State appealed. 
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court held the use of 
the phrase "in office" must necessarily limit the evidence of 
misconduct to that occurring during the current term and 
affilmed the trial court. In so doing, the Court set forth 
the policy considerations supporting this interpretation? 
"The object cf a removal statue has been 
perceived as protecting "the people from 
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unworthy officers while they were serving 
as such officers. The scope of the 
accusation must be limited tc a present 
term of office because the purpose of 
removal is not to determine whether a 
public office has been a good person or a 
bad person in the past but only to 
determine whether, by reason of existing 
facts and circumstances, he should be 
removed from his present office." 
(Citations omitted.) Santillanes, at 544. 
The Court further concluded that: 
"We agree that 'an officer cannot ... be 
removed from office for a violation of his 
duties while serving in another office, 
or in another term of the same office.7 
Thruston v. Clark, 107 Cal. 285, 288, 40 
P. 435, 436 (1895)." Id. az 544. 
Kent submits Bowen and Santillanes are persuasive 
authority for the proposition that Kent cannot be disciplined 
for misconduct that occurred prior to his appointment as a 
field auditor. Kent should therefore be reinstated with back 
pay to the date of termination. 
CONCLUSION 
The Department should be ordered to forthwith reinstate 
Kent and be further ordered to pay him back pay to December 6, 
1991. 
Dated t h i s / ? day of //ZAAASCS , 1 9 9 3 . 
Respectfully submitted, 
.ip W. Dy? 
k/mi/Kent.bri/APPl Attorney for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated 67-19-18 (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated 77-5-1 (1953)(repealed) 
R.468-11.1 of the Utah Administrative Code (1992) 
R.468-11.2 of the Utah Administrative Code (1992) 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, issued 
by the Step 5 Hearing Officer, Sherri Guyon, on March 31, 1992. 
Decision issued by the Career Service Review Board, on 
October 20, 1992. 
Supervisor's Handbook, Separations, Pages 12-1 through 12-
Utah Code Annotated 67-19-18 (1953, as amended) 
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(2) (a) Vacancy notices for career service posi-
tions shall be publicly announced 
d) for periods of time to be determined by 
the director, and 
in) in a manner designed to attract an op-
timum number of qualified applicants 
(b) The director shall ensure that vacancy no-
tices for career service positions are publicly an-
nounced for at least five days 
(3) After consulting with agency officials and out-
slde experts, the director shall approve the examining 
instruments 
(4) When a department requests certification of ap-
plicants who have passed the tests, the director shall 
certify applicants on appropriate registers defined by 
rules established by the director 
(5) The agency head shall make appointments to 
fill vacancies from appropriate registers for proba-
tionary periods to be defined by rules established by 
the director 
(6) A person serving a probationary period may not 
u s e the grievance procedures provided in this chapter 
and m Chapter 19a, Title 67 Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures and may be dismissed at any time by the 
appointing officer without heanng or appeal 
(1) Career service status shall be granted upon the 
successful completion of the probationary period iwi 
67-19-17. Reappointment of employees not re-
tained in exempt position. 
Any career service employee accepting an appoint-
ment to an exempt position who is not retained by the 
appointing officer, unless discharged for cause as pro-
vided by this act or by regulation, shall 
(1) be appointed to any career service position 
for which the employee qualifies in a pay grade 
comparable to the employee's last position in the 
career service provided an opening exists, or 
(2) be appointed to any lesser career service 
position for which the employee qualifies pend-
ing the opening of a position described in Subsec-
tion (1) of this section The director shall main-
tain a reappointment register for this purpose 
and it shall have precedence over other registers 
1979 
67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds 
— Disciplinary action — Procedure — 
Reductions in force. 
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or 
demoted only to advance the good of the public inter-
est, and for just causes such as inefficiency, incompe-
tency failure to maintain skills or adequate perfor-
mance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the or-
ders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or non-
feasance in office 
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of 
race, sex, age, physical handicap, national origin, re-
ligion, political affiliation, or other nonment factor 
including the exercise of rights under this chapter 
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the 
procedural and documentary requirements of disci-
plinary dismissals and demotions 
(4) If an agency head finds that a career service 
employee is charged with aggravated misconduct or 
that retention of a career service employee would en-
danger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave 
threat to the public interest, the employee may be 
suspended pending the administrative appeal to the 
department head as provided in Subsection (5) 
(5) (a) No career service employee may be de-
moted or dismissed unless the department head 
or designated representative has complied with 
this subsection 
(b) The department head or designated repre-
sentative notifies the employee in writing of the 
reasons for the dismissal or demotion 
(c) The emplovee has no less than five working 
days to reply and have the reply considered by 
the department head 
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be 
heard by the department head or designated rep-
resentative 
(e) Following the heanng, the employee may 
be dismissed or demoted if the department head 
finds adequate cause or reason 
(6) (a) Reductions in force required by inadequate 
funds, change of workload, or lack of work are 
governed by retention rosters established bv the 
director 
(b) Under those circumstances 
(0 The agency head shall designate the 
categorv of work to be eliminated, subject to 
review by the director 
(u) Temporary and probationary em-
ployees shall be separated before any career 
service employee 
(in) (A) Career service employees shall 
be separated in the order of their reten-
tion points, the employee with the low-
est points to be discharged first 
IB) Retention points for each career 
service employee shall be computed ac-
cording to rules established by the direc-
tor allowing appropnate consideration 
for proficiency and for senionty in state 
government, including any active duty 
military service fulfilled subsequent to 
original state appointment 
(IV) A career service employee who is sep-
arated in a reduction in force shall be 
(A) placed on the reappointment ros-
ter provided for in Subsection 
67-19-17(2), and 
(B) reappointed without examination 
to any vacancy for which the employee is 
qualified which occurs within one year 
of the date of the separation 
(c) d) An employee separated due to a reduc-
tion in force may appeal to the department 
he^d for an administrative review 
(n) The notice of appeal must be submit 
ted within 20 working days after the em-
ployee's receipt of wntten notification of sep-
aration 
(in) The employee may appeal the deci-
s\oft of the department head acsaYdmg to the 
grievance and appeals procedure of this act 
1991 
67-19-19. Political activity of employees — 
Rules and regulations — Highway pa-
trol — Hatch Act 
Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules 
promulgated under this section for federally aided 
programs, the following provisions apply with regard 
to political activity of career service employees in all 
grades and positions 
(1) State career service employees may volun-
tanly participate in political activity subject to 
the following provisions 
(a) if any state career service employee is 
elected to any partisan or full-time nonparti-
san political office, that employee shall be 
Utah Code Annotated 77-5-1 (1953)(repealed) 
U.C.A. 77-5-1, (1953 
"All officers of any city, county or other political 
subdivision of this state not liable to impeachment shall be 
subject to removal as provided in this chapter upon being 
convicted of a felony, an indictable misdemeanor, a misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude or malfeasance in office." 
R.468-11.1 of the Utah Administrative Code (1992) 
R.468-11.2 of the Utah Administrative Code (1992) 
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bationary employees shall receive a performance 
evaluation at the conclusion of the probationary pe-
riod and again at July 1 of the calendar year Em-
ployees under a constant review status shall be for-
mally evaluated frequently as well as prior to re-
moval from that status 
10-1 (3) The employee shall sign the evaluation un-
der all circumstances Signing the evaluation only 
denotes the employee has reviewed the evaluation 
The evaluation form shall permit the employee's com-
ments, including a space for either agreeing or 
disagreeing with the evaluation The employee shall 
check one of the spaces The employee may comment, 
m writing, either in space provided or on separate 
attachment Refusal to sign shall constitute insubor-
dination subject to discipline 
R468-10-2. Corrective Actions. 
When an employee's performance does not meet es-
tablished standards for reasons other than willful 
misconduct, agency management shall take appropri-
ate documented/clearly labeled corrective action in 
accordance with the following rules 
10-2 (1) The supervisor shall discuss the substan-
dard performance with the employee in an attempt to 
discover the reasons therefor and set forth an appro-
priate written plan 
10-2 (2) Corrective actions shall include one or 
more of the following 
(2)(a) Closer supervision 
(2Kb) Training 
(2)(c) Referral for personal counseling 
(2)(d) Reassignment or transfer 
(2)(e) Use of appropriate leave 
(2)(f) Career counseling and out-placement 
(2)(g) Period of constant review 
(2)(h) Opportunity for remediation 
(2)0) Written warnings 
10-2 (3) During the implementation of a written 
corrective action plan, agency management shall pro-
vide frequent evaluation about the employee's 
progress 
10-2 (4) If, after reasonable effort, the corrective 
actions taken do not result in satisfactorily improved 
performance, the employee shall be disciplined per 
R468-11-1 (2), (3), (4) and (5). The record of the cor-
rective action satisfying the requirement of Section 
67-19-18(1) 
10-2 (5) DHRM shall provide assistance to agency 
management upon request 
R468-10-3. Employee Development and Train-
ing. 
Agency management may establish a program for 
training and staff development consistent with these 
rules 
10-3(1) All agency sponsored training shall be 
agency specific or designed for highly specialized or 
technical jobs and tasks. 
10-3 (2) Agency management shall consult with the 
Executive Director, DHRM, where proposed training 
and development activities have potential statewide 
impact or may be offered most cost effectively on a 
statewide basis. The Executive Director, DHRM, 
shall determine whether DHRM shall be responsible 
for such activities 
10-3 (3) The Executive Director, DHRM, shall work 
with agency management to establish principles to 
guide the development of statewide activities and to 
facilitate sharing of resources statewide. 
R468-10-4. Education Assistance. 
State agencies may assist employees in their educa-
tional goals by either granting administrative leave 
to attend classes or subsidizing the educational ex-
pense of employees but subject to the following condi-
tions 
10-4(1) The educational program will provide a 
benefit to the State 
10-4 (2) The employee shall successfully complete 
the required course work with a passing grade 
10-4 (3) The employee shall agree to repay any 
such assistance which was received for educational 
work completed in the year immediately preceding 
voluntary termination 
10-4 (4) Education assistance shall not exceed 
$1,500 in any one fiscal year Agencies shall have the 
prerogative of approving program participation of 
any one employee up to and including $1,500, but 
shall use contract requirements and standards ap-
proved by DHRM Agencies which subsidize educa-
tion of employees beyond the $1,500 amount shall 
receive approval of the respective department head 
10-4 (5) When an agency directs an employee to 
participate in an educational program, then the 
agency shall fully pay the costs thereof 
10-4 (6) Educational assistance reimbursements to 
employees may be taxable pursuant to IRS regula-
tions 
(6)(a) Tuition reimbursement paid for undergrad-
uate college classes shall not be taxable as income 
(6)(b) Tuition paid for graduate level classes shall 
be taxable as income 
1990 67-19-6(5) 
R468-11. Discipline. 
R468-11-1 Disciplinary Action 
R468-11-2 Dismissal or Demotion 
R468-11-1. Disciplinary Action. 
Noncompliance with these rules, departmental 
safety policies, professional standards adopted by a 
department, work place policies, and such matters as 
inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills, 
adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloy-
alty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfea-
sance, nonfeasance in office, or failure to advance the 
good of the public interest shall be cause for disciplin-
ary action 
11-1(1) The type and severity of any disciplinary 
action taken shall be governed by principles of due 
process which include 
(l)(a) Consistent application 
(1Kb) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(l)(c) Determination of fact 
(l)(d) Timely notice of noncompliance 
(l)(e) Opportunity to respond and rebut as defined 
herein 
11-1.(2) If the agency determines that a career ser-
vice employee is charged with aggravated or repeti-
tive misconduct or that retention of a career service 
employee would endanger the peace and safety of 
others or pose grave threat to the public interest, the 
agency, pending an investigation to determine fact 
upon which disciplinary action may be taken, shall 
utilize one or more of the following options 
(2)(a) The employee may be placed on paid adminis-
trative leave 
(2Kb) The employee may be temporarily reassigned 
to another position or different work location at the 
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same rate of pay pending the completion of the inves-
tigation. 
11-1.(3) In all cases, except as provided under Sec-
tion 67-19-18(2) disciplinary action includes the fol-
lowing: 
(3)(a) The agency representative notifies the em-
ployee in writing of the proposed discipline and the 
reasons therefor; 
(3)(b) The employee has five working days within 
which to reply in writing and have the reply consid-
ered by the agency representative before discipline is 
imposed; 
(3)(c) An employee waives the right to respond and 
discipline may be imposed if the employee does not 
reply within the time frames stated in these rules or 
as established by the agency representative, which-
ever is longer. 
11-1.(4) After an employee has been informed of the 
reasons for the proposed discipline and has been 
given an opportunity to respond and be responded to, 
discipline may be imposed by the agency representa-
tive as appropriate. The type and severity of disci-
pline may take into consideration the severity of the 
infraction, the repeated nature of violations, prior 
disciplinary actions, previous oral warnings and dis-
cussions, the employee's past work record, the effect 
on agency operations, and the potential of the viola-
tions for causing damage to persons or property. Dis-
ciplinary action may include one or more of the fol-
lowing options: 
(4)(a) Written reprimand 
(4)(b) Suspension of the employee without pay up to 
30 calendar days per occurrence requiring discipline. 
(4)(c) Demotion of the employee utilizing one of the 
following methods as provided by law: 
1) An employee may be moved from a position in 
one class to a position in another class having a lower 
entrance salary if the duties of the position have been 
reduced for disciplinary reasons. 
2) A demotion within the employee's current pay 
range may be accomplished by lowering the em-
ployee's salary rate back on the range, as determined 
by the agency head or designee. 
(4)(d) An agency head shall dismiss or demote an 
employee only in accordance with the provision of 
Section 67-19-18(3). See R468-11-2 of these rules. 
(4)(e) Disciplinary actions are subject to the griev-
ance and appeals procedure as provided by law. 
11-1.(5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed 
the employee shall be notified of the discipline, the 
reasons for the discipline, the effective date and 
length of the rfiscipfine and the standard of conduct 
necessary to avoid further discipline. 
R468-11-2. Dismissal or Demotion. 
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for 
cause as explained under 10-2 and 11-1 of these rules 
as follows: 
11-2.(1) An agency head may dismiss an employee 
having other than career service status, without right 
of appeal, for cause upon providing written notifica-
tion to the employee specifying the reasons for the 
dismissal and the effective date. 
11-2.(2) No person shall be dismissed or demoted 
from a career service position unless the agency head 
or designee has observed the following procedures 
and the Grievance Procedure Rules: 
(2)(a) The agency head or designee shall notify the 
employee in writing of the specific reasons for the 
dismissal or demotion. 
(2)(b) The employee shall have no less than five 
working days to reply and to have the reply consid-
ered by the agency head. 
(2)(c) The employee shall have an opportunity to be 
heard by the agency head or designee. 
(2)(d) Following such a hearing an employee may 
be dismissed or demoted if the agency head or desig-
nee finds adequate cause or reason. 
11-2.(3) Agency management may suspend an em-
ployee with pay pending the administrative appeal to 





R468-12-2. Abandonment of Position. 
R468-12-3. Reduction in Force. 
R468-12-4. Exceptions. 
R468-12-1. Resignation. 
An employee may resign by giving written or ver-
bal notice to the appointing authority. 
12-1.(11 An employee's resignation may be accepted 
without prejudice if received ten working days prior 
to its effactive date. 
12-1.(2) An employee may withdraw a resignation 
on the next working day after its submission. After 
the close of the next working day following its sub-
mission, withdrawal of a resignation may occur only 
With the consent of the appointing authority. 
&468-12-2. Abandonment of Position. 
An employee who is absent from work for three 
consecutive days and is capable of providing proper 
notification to his supervisor but does not, shall be 
deemed to have abandoned his position. The em-
ployee shall be informed of the action in writing by 
the appointing authority and shall have appeal rights 
Within ten working days of the notice. 
&468-123. Reduction in Force. 
Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, 
Change of workload, or lack of work shall be governed 
by the following rules: 
12-3.(1) When a reduction in force results in a re-
duction of staff in one or more classes, and before any 
Career service employee is notified of being reduced in 
force, the appointing authority shall develop a work 
force adjustment plan (WFAP). The following items 
ahall be considered in developing the work force ad-
justment plan. 
(l)(a) Categories of work to be eliminated 
(1Kb) Inter-changeability of skills 
(l)(c) Specifications of measures taken to facilitate 
the placement of affected employees through normal 
Attrition, retirement, transfer, reassignment, and vol-
untary relocation 
(l)(d) Temporary furlough 
The provisions of section R468-8-5.Q2) may be im-
plemented only after all other cost saving methods 
have been exhausted. Additionally, the provisions of 
section R468-8-5.Q2) may be implemented prior-to a 
reduction in force if the furlough results in the neces-
sary cost savings and is consistent with reasons of 
business necessity. A reduction in force shall be the 
last, unavoidable action taken for cost savings. 
(l)(e) A list of all affected employees showing the 
retention points for each employee 
12-3.(2) No employee may be RIF'd who has not 
been identified in a properly developed and approved 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, issued 
by the Step 5 Hearing Officer, Sherri Guyon, on March 31, 1992. 
ls*f 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 





FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECISION 
Case No. 10 CSRB/H.O. 138 
AUTHORITY 
In compliance with Utah Code Annotated §67-19a-406, an administrative hearing at 
Step 5 was held at 8:30 a.m., February 7, 1992, in Conference Room 1116 of the State 
Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah. Charles D. Kent (Grievant), was present 
and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law; the Department of Employment 
Security (Department and Agency) was represented by Don Avery, Chief of Contributions, 
and K. Allan Zabel, Legal Counsel. A court reporter made a verbatim record of the 
proceedings; testimony and documentary evidence were received into the record. Witnesses 
were placed under oath. This Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 63-46b-2(l)(h)) now makes and enters the following: 
ISSUES 
1. Is Grievant entitled to prevail on his October 23, 1991 appeal from 
termination? 
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Grievant was originally hired as an Accountant 17 with the Utah Department of 
Employment Security on approximately October 9, 1984; this was not a career service 
position. (See Agency Exhibit #5.) 
2. Subsequently, Grievant attained career service status (on approximately 
January 13, 1986). 
3. On October 6, 1986, Grievant attained the position of Field Auditor 21. (See 
Agency Exhibit #6.) 
4. In March 1990, Grievant was temporarily assigned to the Clearfield Office as an 
Interviewer. (See Grievant Exhibit #7.) Grievant returned to his former position of Field 
Auditor in July 1990. Grievant' s Supervisor testified that Grievant was doing an acceptable 
job as a Field Auditor; Grievant met the requirements for quantity and quality of work. 
(See Grievant Exhibits #4 and #5.) 
5. On approximately May 1, 1991, Grievant fs supervisor, Don Avery, learned that 
Grievant had been indicted by a federal grand jury for fraudulently endorsing ten 
U.S. Treasury checks. (See Grievant Exhibit #2.) Mr. Avery and Grievant discussed the 
situation and Grievant assured his supervisor that he was not guilty. Mr. Avery testified that 
he told Grievant that if he were found guilty, it would have an impact on his employment. 
Grievant was placed under closer supervision and his duties were restricted to reduce his 
handling of trust fund moneys. Mr. Avery asked Grievant to keep him informed about the 
progress of the indictment situation. 
6. On August 8, 1991, Grievant pleaded guilty to one count of fraudulently signing 
a U.S. Treasury check, a misdemeanor. (See Grievant Exhibit #3.) His sentencing hearing 
occurred on November 1, 1991. (See Agency Exhibit #2.) 
7. On October 4, 1991, Grievant's supervisor gave Grievant a written Notification 
of Intent to Discipline by dismissal from the Department. Grievant' s supervisor listed the 
specific reasons for his recommendation for dismissal that are summarized as follows: 
Grievant had entered a plea of guilty to forging an endorsement on a U.S. Treasury check; 
Grievant had failed to keep his supervisor apprised of the progress of his case as he had 
been specifically requested to do; and, Grievant !s continued employment was not in the 
best interest of the Department because Contributions employees, especially those handling 
Trust Fund moneys, must have unquestionable reputations for honesty and trustworthiness. 
(See Agency Exhibit #3.) 
8. On October 23, 1991, Grievant grieved the recommendation for dismissal. On 
October 30, 1991, Grievant fs supervisor advised Grievant that he had considered 
Grievant's written response, but that he still recommended dismissal. (See Agency 
Exhibit #1.) 
9. On November 15, 1991, a hearing was conducted for Grievant before the 
Administrator of the Department of Employment Security, Floyd G. Astin (Administrator). 
On December 3, 1991, A Disciplinary Decision was issued by the Administrator in which 
Grievant was informed that he was to be dismissed effective at the close of business 
December 6,1991. The reasons for the decision to dismiss were stated and are summarized 
as follows: Grievant had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and, equally as 
important, Grievant had failed to keep his supervisor informed of the progress of his case, 
even though he had been specifically requested to do so; and, these actions had disabled 
him from continued effectiveness as an employee of the Department. (See Agency 
Exhibit #1.) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Grievant is a career service employee with the Department of Employment 
Security and is properly entitled to a hearing before the Career Service Review board that 
is governed by Administrative Rules R140-1-1 through -22. 
2. Human Resource Management Rule R479-11-2 states that following a hearing by 
the Department, an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the department head finds 
adequate cause or reason. An employee must not be dismissed for arbitrary or capricious 
reasons, but rather for "adequate cause or reason." 
3. Pursuant to its responsibilities under DHRM Rule R468-11-2, a department head 
must exercise discretion to make a determination of "adequate cause or reason.1' The 
exercise of discretion must not be abused. 
4. Page 12-2 of the Supervisor Handbook for the Department of Employment Security 
states that, "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude" is one basis for dismissal for 
cause. The reasons listed are not all-inclusive however, and other reasons may be found to 
be "adequate cause or reason" by proper exercise of the Agency! s discretion. 
5. CSRB Rule R140-l-20(c) states "latitude and consideration" shall be given by 
the Hearing Officer to the Agencyf s prior decision. 
6. DHRM Rule R468-11-1.(1) states that the type and severity of any disciplinary 
action taken shall be governed by principles of due process that include consistent 
application, prior knowledge of rules and standards, determination of fact, and timely notice 
of noncompliance. 
7. DHRM Rule R468-11-1.(4) states that discipline may be imposed by the agency 
representative "as appropriate" and that several factors (which are delineated hereafter) 
may be taken into consideration in determining the specific type and severity of the 
discipline. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Latitude and Consideration Given to Agency1 s Decision 
Grievant asserts that "consideration" not "deference" should be given by the 
Hearing Officer to the Departments decision to discipline. The Department concurs and 
so does the Hearing Officer. The Administrative Rules of the Career Service Review Board, 
at R140-1-20(C) (effective December 16, 1991) states: 
Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new 
hearing for the record, with both parties being accorded full administrative 
due process. The hearing officer shall give latitude and consideration to an 
agencyf s prior decision when the latter is supported by the findings of fact 
based on the evidence. 
As part of the decision-making process of this hearing procedure, the Hearing Officer has 
given "latitude and consideration" to the Departmentf s decision to terminate Grievant. 
B. Review of the Disciplinary Action Taken 
Also, as part of the decision-making process of this hearing procedure, the Hearing 
Officer must review the actions the Department took with regard to Grievant to determine: 
1) if there was adequate cause for discipline; 2) if substantial evidence existed to show that 
due process was followed in notifying Grievant of the action being taken; 3) if the decision 
to terminate was reasonable use of agency discretion, and 4) if the discipline was 
disproportionate to the actions of Grievant or if it was appropriate under the circumstances. 
Human Resource Management Rules (July 1, 1991), states: 
R468-11-2 Dismissal or Demotion 
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause as explained under 
10-2 and 11-1 of these rules as follows: 
11-2.(2) No employee shall be dismissed or demoted from a career 
service position unless the agency head or designee has 
observed the following procedures and the Grievance 
Procedure Rules: 
(2)(a) The agency head or designee shall notify the employee in 
writing of the specific reasons for the dismissal or demotion. 
(2)(b) The employee shall have no less than ten working days to reply 
and to have the reply considered by the department head or 
designee. 
(2)(c) The employee shall have an opportunity to be heard by the 
department head or designee. 
(2)(d) Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or 
demoted if the department head finds adequate cause or 
reason. (Emphasis added.) 
Page 12-2 of the Supervisor Handbook for the Department of Employment Security 
(January 1990) states: 
Dismissals for Cause 
Failure to satisfactorily complete probation period. 
Failure to report to work 
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis added.) 
Negligence, inefficiency or unfitness to perform duties. 
Violation of Department or State regulations. 
Gross misconduct or insubordination. 
The rules stated above show that management of an agency has the authority to 
terminate an employee for what it considers to be, in the exercise of its discretion, adequate 
cause. Several examples of cause are listed, but these are not all-inclusive. Management 
may dismiss an employee if it determines there is "adequate cause or reason." In this case, 
Grievant's supervisor informed Grievant that he was recommending dismissal because 
Grievant had pled guilty to forging an endorsement on a U.S. Treasury check and because 
Grievant had failed to keep him apprised of the progress of his case, even though he had 
specifically been requested to do so. Grievant ' s supervisor testified that he felt Grievant! s 
credibility had been damaged, especially by Grievantf s failure to communicate openly and 
honestly with his supervisor. Grievant' s supervisor also testified that he had lost confidence 
in Grievant !s ability to function effectively in his position. 
The Administrator conducted a hearing on beh. *f Grievant and basically concurred 
with the supervisor's recommendation. The Administrator considered Grievantfs 
conviction to be a crime of moral turpitude, which was specifically listed as a reason to 
dismiss for cause; but even further, he considered Grievant *N S'liire to communicate with 
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his supervisor as an equally important cause for dismissal. 
Grievant asserted that there were no specific rules of professional conduct delinea 
in the Department's rules and regulations and that, therefore, it was an error for the 
Department to cite the violation of professional policies as a reason for discipline. The 
Administrator testified, however, that he feels there is certain professional conduct that is 
"understood" in general by employees in positions such as Grievant fs. It seems to be 
generally understood that an employee! s reputation for honesty and trustworthiness must 
be without question. This is especially true in a sensitive position such as Grievantf s when 
trust fund moneys are involved. 
Grievant1 s supervisor and the Administrator testified that they considered the 
alternative of transferring Grievant to a different position where the issue of honesty and 
trustworthiness would not be so critical, but that another position was not available. 
In summation, the Agency determined that Grievantf s credibility had been damaged 
by his guilty plea and by his failure to communicate about the indictment process. It also 
determined that his conduct had constituted a violation of certain "understood" policies of 
professional conduct. The Agency further determined that it had lost confidence in 
Grievantfs ability to function effectively in his present position, and that a realistic 
opportunity for transfer did not exist. 
Taken altogether, these determinations constitute a finding that substantial evidence 
exists to support Agency's decision to discipline Grievant. The Agency followed its own 
policies by holding a hearing for Grievant, and it exercised its discretion reasonably by 
determining, from the hearing, that "adequate cause" existed for discipline. 
C. Time Period of Grievantf s Actions 
Grievant asserts that the actions for which he was disciplined did not occur while he 
was in his current position, so that he should not properly have been disciplined for them. 
While it is true that the forgery occurred while he was in a former position, the guilty plea 
and the failure to communicate with his supervisor did occur while he was in his current 
position. The actions that led to the finding of "adequate cause or reason" occurred in a 
relevant and reasonable time period and were properly used as the basis for discipline. 
D. Nexus Requirement 
Grievant properly asserted that the Department has the burden to show the nexus 
between Grievant' s misconduct and its detrimental effect on his job performance that would 
warrant discipline of some sort. Grievant fs supervisor communicated to Grievant in his 
Notice of Intent to Discipline that he felt Grievantf s continued employment was not in the 
best interest of the Department because employees, especially those handling Trust Fund 
moneys, must have reputations for honesty and trustworthiness that are beyond question. 
He further testified to this fact at the hearing. The Administrator testified that Grievantf s 
actions had caused management to lose confidence in him and his ability to function 
optimally; Grievant, the Administrator claimed, had been disabled from continued 
effectiveness as an employee of the Department. 
The Agency provided the necessary link between Grievant! s actions and the necessity 
to discipline him for them, by showing that Grievantf s failure to communicate during the 
indictment process, in addition to the guilty plea, both contributed to the Agency! s loss of 
confidence in Grievant and to the loss of Grievant1 s credibility to function as an effective 
employee in this sensitive position requiring unquestioned trustworthiness and honesty. The 
Hearing Officer finds that the Agency carried its burden by providing substantial evidence 
to show that a nexus existed between Grievantf s actions on the job and off the job, and his 
ability to function in his position. 
His credibility as an employee, as well as management' s confidence in him as an 
employee, had been impaired by his failure to communicate reasonably or adequately with 
his supervisor as he had specifically been requested to do. 
E. Severity of Discipline 
Human Resource Management Rules (July 1, 1991), R468-11-1.(1) states: 
R468-11-1 Disciplinary Action 
11-1.(1) The type and severity of any disciplinary action taken shall be 
governed by principles of due process which include: 
(l)(a) Consistent application 
(l)(b) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(l)(c) Determination of fact 
(l)(d) Timely notice of noncompliance 
(l)(e) Opportunity to respond and rebut as defined herein 
Human Resource Management Rules (July 1, 1991), R468-ll-l.(4) states: 
7 
After an employee has been informed of the reasons for the 
proposed discipline and has been given an opportunity to 
respond and be responded to, discipline may be imposed by the 
agency representative as appropriate. In determining the 
specific type and severity of the discipline to be taken, 
consideration may be given to such factors as the severity of the 
infraction, the repeated nature of violations, prior 
disciplinary/corrective actions, previous oral warnings, written 
warnings and discussions, the employee f s past work record, the 
effect on agency operations, and the potential of the violations 
for causing damage to persons or property. . . . 
When an agency is determining the type and severity of discipline it will mete out to 
an employee, several factors must be taken into account, as listed in the above-mentioned 
rules. Of particular relevance to the case at hand are the severity of the infraction, any 
prior knowledge of rules and standards, any previous oral warnings and discussions, and the 
overall effect on the Agency' s operations. 
An agency has the discretion to assess the discipline it deems appropriate under the 
circumstances. In this case, Grievant pled guilty to one count of fraudulently signing a 
U.S. Treasury check, a misdemeanor, which the Department considered to be a crime of 
moral turpitude. Grievant's supervisor testified that new employees go through an 
orientation that introduces employees to the policies and procedures of the Department. 
Presumably, this includes relevant "rules and standards." Also, Grievant's supervisor 
testified that he had discussed with Grievant the impact that a criminal conviction would 
have on his employment. Thus, Grievant had been put on notice that a conviction would 
have serious consequences directly related to his job status. The facts reveal that this 
discussion took place several months before his court appearance. 
Also, Grievant's immediate supervisor and the Administrator both gave evidence 
about how the Department's operations would be adversely affected by Grievant's 
continued employment. Grievant' s supervisor stated that the Department had worked very 
hard to establish an image of having honest and trustworthy employees, and that Grievantf s 
continued employment would not be conducive to that image. Both Grievantf s supervisor 
and the Administrator stressed that Grievant's failure to communicate with management 
during the progress of his case was very distressing to management. They also stated that 
their loss of confidence in Grievant's ability to be an effective employee was very 
destructive to the employee-employer relationship. This lack of communication weighed 
very heavily in the Departmentf s final determination to dismiss Grievant. 
Management weighed several factors in making the decision to dismiss Grievant: the 
guilty plea to a misdemeanor involving honesty and trust, which were very important aspects 
of Grievant fs position; the presumption that Grievant would be aware of certain 
"understood" professional behaviors in a position of his level; the oral discussions his 
supervisor had with him about the impact a conviction would have on his job status; the 
exploration by the Agency of the possibility of transfer for Grievant. All these were 
considered by the Agency in making its determination. The Hearing Officer finds that the 
Agency acted reasonably in making its determination to discipline Grievant by dismissal and 
that it exercised its discretion with sound judgment and not arbitrarily or capriciously. 
DECISION 
Based upon the above Findings of fact, Conclusions of Law and Discussion, the 
grievance is hereby respectfully denied. 
DATED this &\ day of March 1992. 
)HVW 
Sherri R. Guyon 
CSRB Hearing Officer 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision. R140-1-20(M) 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this decision must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten working 
days upon receipt of this decision. Utah Code Annotated (1989), §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i). 
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: : 
CHARLES D. KENT, : 
Grievant and Appellant, : DECISION 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, : 
: Case Nos.: 10 CSRB/H.O. 138 (Step 5) 
Agency and Respondent. : 4 CSRB 40 (Step 6) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level 
review of the above-captioned case on July 21, 1992. The following Board members 
participated at the hearing during oral argument and deliberation: Chairman 
Bruce T. Jones, Jean M. Bishop, Kathleen Hirabayashi and Jose L. Trujillo. 
Charles D. Kent (Kent and Appellant) was present and represented by his attorney, 
Phillip W. Dyer. The Utah Department of Employment Security (Department) was 
represented by K. Allan Zabel, Legal Counsel for the Department. A certified court 
reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeding before the Board, which is commonly 
referred to as a Step 6 appeal hearing. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board' s authority is set forth in the Grievance and Anneal Procedures Act, Utah 
Code Annotated §67-19a-101 through -408 (Supp. 1992). The CSJ ' I \»s regulatory provisions 
or administrative rules are published in the Utah Administrative Code §137-1- through -22 
(1992 Supp.). This case has proceeded properly through the State' s grievance procedures, 
and the Board has assumed jurisdiction over the Appellant • s appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 
or Board-level review constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under 
the codified Grievance and Appeal Procedures, pursuant to §67-19a-202(l)(a), -407 and -
408, as well as constituting a formal adjudication and a final agency action under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Annotated §63-46b et seq. Following 
oral argument, the Board members closed the record and entered into an executive session 
for deliberation and decision-making. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Kent was hired in a temporary capacity as a contractual employee in an Accountant, 
Grade 17, position on October 9, 1984, by the Department. On April 22, 1985, Kent was 
promoted to Accountant, Grade 19. As of January 13,1986, Appellant became a permanent 
employee with career service status. Later that year, on October 6, Kent was promoted to 
Accountant, Grade 21. In January 1989, Kent applied for and was selected for the position 
of Field Auditor II, at the Grade 21 level. Ostensibly due to departmental budget problems 
during March 1990, Kent was temporarily transferred to the Clearfield office where he 
performed Interviewer tasks, which included handling claims and doing placement work. 
Albeit, Kent believed that he had been transferred by the Department in March due to the 
Treasury Department's investigation in January into his affairs (T. 108-10, 129, 131). 
Appellant was reassigned back to the Departmentf s headquarters where he continued to 
serve as a Field Auditor II, until his dismissal in December 1991. 
Kent! s employment difficulties had their origin when he was indicted by a federal 
grand jury just prior to May 1991. At that time, Kentf s supervisor, Don Avery, learned that 
Appellant had been charged with forging his signature to ten Social Security Administration 
checks issued to Kentfs deceased father. Kent attended a federal court hearing on 
August 8,1991, where he plea bargained to a guilty count of fraudulently signing one United 
States Treasury check, which constituted a misdemeanor crime rather than the original 
felony. In return, the ten felony charges were dismissed. On November 1, 1991, Kent was 
sentenced to one count of a misdemeanor crime. Kent's sentence included paying a 
restoration amount of $18,207 to the United States government, being placed on probation 
for a five-year period, and paying a $2,000 fine. 
A month prior to Kent's sentencing, the Department issued him a Notice of Intent 
to Discipline, dated October 4,1991. Don Avery, who had been promoted from supervisor 
to Chief of Contributions in August 1991 and was now the departmental manager over Kent, 
placed Kent on notice of pending discipline, as follows: 
You are notified of my intent to recommend to the 
Administrator that you be disciplined through dismissal from 
this agency. 
You are advised of this disciplinary action "to advance the good 
of the public interest11 (Utah Code §67-19-18(1)), R468-11-
1.3(a), and pursuant to the following under R468-11.1 for 
noncompliance with professional standards adopted by this 
Department. The specific reasons for my intent to impose this 
disciplinary action are: 
On August 8, 1991[,] you appeared before Judge 
David K. Winder in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, case number 91-NCR-34W, and entered a plea 
of guilty to forging the endorsement "Charles L. Kent" on a 
United States Treasury check. 
Since May 1, 1991[,] when I learned of your indictment, you 
have assured me of your innocence. I asked you to keep me 
apprised of the progress of your case, but at no time did you 
voluntarily do so. I repeatedly had to request status reports 
from you. You also failed to inform me of your August 8 court 
appointment and your intentions to plead guilty. During this 
entire period your actions have been less than helpful and your 
intent misleading. 
Contributions employees, especially those handling Trust Fund 
monies, must have reputations for honesty and trustworthiness 
which are unquestionable. It is not in the best interest of this 
Department to have you working in such a responsible position 
as that of a Field Auditor subsequent to your admission of guilt 
to a criminal act of forgery. (Agency Exh. 3.) 
On November 15, 1991, Kent was invited to participate in a pretermination 
departmental hearing in order to respond to Averyf s Notice of Intent to Discipline/Dismiss. 
The Departmentf s administrator (chief operating officer), Floyd G. Astin, conducted this 
hearing. Astin framed the issue he was considering regarding Kent's conduct in his 
December 3, 1991 Disciplinary Decision, as follows: 
The issue in this matter is whether you should be dismissed 
from the Department and [from] state service to advance the 
good of the public interest for noncompliance with professional 
standards adopted by this Department. Specifically, should you 
be dismissed for having been convicted of a crime of moral 
turpitude while employed by the Department? 
After making factual findings, the administrator made an ultimate conclusion that due 
to Kent's "act of forgery and failure to communicate honestly and openly with [your] 
supervisor has disabled you from continued effectiveness as an employee of the 
Department." (Agency Exh. 1.) Appellant was notified that his dismissal would be effective 
on December 6, 1991. 
ISSUES 
A. Step 5 Issues and Decision 
The issues adjudicated by the CSRB' s hearing officer at the evidentiary/Step 5 level 
were twofold: 
1. Is Grievant entitled to prevail on his October 23, 1991, 
appeal from termination? 
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
The hearing officer first determined that the departmental hearing for Kent had adduced 
sufficient evidence to show that adequate cause existed to discipline him (p. 6). Next, the 
Step 5 Decision held that the Departmentf s officials had exercised reasonable judgment in 
dismissing Kent without the presence of arbitrariness or capaciousness in their decision to 
dismiss him (p. 9). 
B. Issues Presented Upon Appeal 
Appellant offered four legal arguments as a basis for overturning the evidentiary/ 
Step '5 Decisionf s ruling. In his four points, Kent argued that: (1) the hearing officer had 
abused her discretion in finding legal cause to support the Department's termination 
decision; (2) because the Department had not previously adopted so-called "professional 
standards" as set forth in the termination notice, Kentf s termination is void; (3) Appellant 
should not be disciplined for conduct which occurred prior to his last-held position, that of 
Field Auditor; and (4) the Department failed in its burden of proving a nexus between 
Kentf s misconduct and his job duties. 
Appellantf s presentation during the Step 6 oral argument primarily expanded upon 
the four above-mentioned points. 
C. The Boardf s Standards of Review 
R137-1-21 D. sets forth the Board's applicable standards of review as follows: 
Standards of Review The boardf s decision shall be based upon 
the following: 
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1. The board fs standards of review consist of determining: 
(a) whether the hearing officerf s evidentiary decision was 
supported by substantial evidence; (b) whether that decision is 
warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal; 
and (c) whether the hearing officer's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are correct and accurate based upon the 
evidence in the record. 
This tribunal will proceed by carefully reviewing the entire record to determine 
whether the decision below contains credible substantial evidence, whether the Step 5 
Decision is warranted by the facts and circumstances, and whether the evidentiary factual 
findings are correct and accurate based upon the record evidence. Moreover, in addition 
to the correctness of the factual findings, we will consider their reasonableness. In reviewing 
the Step 5 record as a whole, the Board will further consider whether the hearing officer 
correctly applied the relevant policies, administrative rules, and statutes. 
D. Burden of Proof at Step 6 
At the evidentiary/Step 5 level, the burden of proof as well as the burden of going 
forward were borne by the Department due to the Kentf s dismissal, which resulted in the 
loss of a vested property interest, that of his continued employment, benefits, and indicia 
of office. As Kent is the appealing party at the appellate/Step 6 level, he shoulders the 
burden of proof as the moving party to this review. 
DISCUSSION 
The Department' s officials learned about the indictment against Appellant about 
April 30, 1991, when a local newspaper published an article about the charges. Avery 
discussed the charges with Kent, and the latter then told Avery that he was innocent of any 
wrongdoing. At hearing, Avery recalled that Kent had told him that his brother had been 
the person who endorsed the ten federal checks, not Kent (T. 37). According to Avery, 
Kent professed his innocence (T. 37). Furthermore, Avery told Kent at that time that if 
Kent were proven guilty, it would effect his employment (T, 39, 45). During this first 
conversation, Avery further told Appellant to keep him (Avery) informed regarding the 
status of the indictment and the progress of Kentfs court case (T. 40). Supervisor Avery 
promptly placed Kent under a corrective action/work plan of "closer supervision" and 
immediately restricted his handling of all Trust Fund monies (T. 42-43). Avery testified that 
Kent never voluntarily came to him to update his supervisor on the status of his court case, 
including the August 8, 1991 court date (T. 56-47). 
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Appellant argues that the CSRB hearing officer relied upon her own notion of 
"adequate cause" to sustain the Department's termination of Kent, and that the fact 
finder's reliance upon R468-11-21 is erroneous in that "adequate cause" is not the same 
as "just cause."2 While §67-19-18(1) employs the term "just causes," the Human Resource 
Management Rules use "cause" and "for cause" terminology. More specifically, Kent posits: 
"The appropriate standard is to first determine whether an appropriate 'cause1 for 
termination exists under R468-11-1 and then the fact finder must determine if that cause is 
adequate or sufficient" (Brief, p. 8). Kent urges that a two-prong test is involved in 
dismissal cases: first, that the fact finder must find a specific legal cause which must rise to 
the level of "adequate cause" as set forth in the Human Resource Management Rules 
R468-11 et seq.; then the trier of fact must essay whether the legal cause/adequate cause 
meets the "just cause" standard. Appellant's conclusion is that, "Since the fact finder 
failed to first make a finding of any ' cause' under R468-11-1, the Decision below is without 
reason or rationality and cannot be sustained." {Ibid.). 
We disagree with Appellant' s distinguishing between "just cause" and "for cause," 
"cause," and "adequate cause." The Board believes that these terms are synonymous and 
fully interchangeable in practice and usage, both as set forth in the State Personnel 
Management Act and in the Human Resource Management Rules. The trier of fact used the 
term "adequate cause" in the Step 5 Decision; this same term is found at R468-ll-2.(2)(d) 
("adequate cause or reason."). The hearing officer properly relied upon this rule, and the 
rule is not inconsistent with statutory intent or meaning.3 
This tribunal further holds that there is little if no distinction between "good cause" 
(or "just cause") and the statutory basis for discipline which sets forth the ground of "to 
advance the good of the public interest." The latter is comparable to the federal civil 
service' s "efficiency of the service" criterion. Importantly, the hearing officer found that 
the Department had relied not upon one ground or reason for Kent' s dismissal but had 
relied upon a collective basis, when she summarized that: 
Management weighed several factors in making the decision to 
dismiss [Kent]: the guilty plea to a misdeme . ; involving 
honesty and trust, which were very important .'^pects of 
Grievantf s position; the presumption that Grievant would be 
aware of certain "understood" professional behaviors in a 
position of his level; the oral discussions his supervisor had with 
him about the impact a conviction would have on his job status; 
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the exploration by the Agency of the possibility of [of a job] 
transfer for [Kent]. (Step 5 Decision, p. 9.) 
The record shows that Administrator Astin considered the above-mentioned factors in the 
weighing of his decision at the departmental hearing (T. 74-77, 78, 79, 80, 82, passim). 
Appellant avers that the phrase "in office" in the dismissal/demotion statute at 
§67-19-18(1) means that the cause giving rise to any disciplinary penalty must occur while 
the accused state employee is serving in the position concomitant to the time the infraction 
occurs. In this instance, Kent claims that because his check forging activity took place 
during 1985-86 when was an Accountant, he should not be punished in 1991 when he held 
the position of Field Auditor. This argument must be rejected. It makes no sense, for 
example, that a bank teller who embezzled bank money two years ago and was not'caught 
then but has since become a loan officer, but cannot now be punished because the former 
teller did the embezzling before becoming a loan officer. Rather, throughout his seven year 
term with the Department, Kent had substantial fiscal responsibilities in the collecting, 
accounting, and auditing of monies being paid into the Departmentf s Trust Fund. Kent! s 
off-duty misconduct cannot be overlooked or voided simply because he was serving in a 
different position when the federal indictment took place. 
The Board holds that "in office" as used in §67-19-18(1) refers to an employeef s full 
term of service, sequentially and continuously. Career service employees continue to work 
indefinitely until their death, resignation, retirement, dismissal, etc. There is no specific 
term for being "in office" as used in the above mentioned statute. This use of "in office" 
is legally distinguishable from that of elected officials who may be held accountable for their 
actions during a particular elected term of service, while they are "in office" as an elected 
official. See State v. Bowen, 620 P.2d 72 (Utah 1980). That Kent! s federal violations 
occurred five or six years ago is not a stale incident, nor does the time lapse mitigate his 
crime. 
APPELLATE CONCLUSIONS 
Appellant maintains that the Step 5 Hearing Officer "made findings only that tend 
to support the Department's termination of Grievant." (Appellant's Brief, p. 1.) The 
Department! s brief accepted the hearing officerf s Step 5 findings of fact, except to correct 
Kent! s promotion trail to show that Appellant was promoted in October 1986 to 
Accountant 21, rather than to Field Auditor 21; not until January 1989, did Kent become 
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a Field Auditor. We correct the record below, accordingly, and note this correction as de 
minimis. Other than the just-mentioned Accountant/Field Auditor correction, we fully 
accept the factual findings of the evidentiary/Step 5 Decision and adopt them as our own 
findings. As a matter of law, the Board now makes and enters the following legal 
conclusions: 
1. Grievant was indicted on felony charges for fraudulently endorsing ten United 
States Treasury checks while holding the position of Field Auditor II, Grade 21. Kent pled 
guilty to the crime of filing a false claim with the Social Security Administration. A guilty 
plea is equivalent to a conviction. Kent admitted forging the signature of his deceased 
father on the ten Treasury checks. The plea bargain resulted in one misdemeanor 
conviction of forgery. Felony forgery and misdemeanor fraud are violations of moral 
turpitude. 
2. In 1985-86, when Kent committed the just-mentioned felony crime, he held an 
Accountant job title with the working title of Collections Officer. As a Collections Officer, 
Kent collected unemployment contributions and benefits overpayments, which belonged to 
the Unemployment Compensation Fund, pursuant to §35-4-9. At the time of his federal 
indictment in 1991, Kent held an even more responsible position of Field Auditor in which 
capacity he audited employers to insure their compliance with the statutory tax obligations 
that require employers to pay into the Unemployment Compensation Fund, and to collect 
those taxes which are due as a result of the audits he performed. Both as 
Accountant/Collections Officer and as Field Auditor, Appellant served in a fiduciary 
capacity {Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, p. 625). Through his acknowledged forgery 
and plea bargaining, Kent violated his fiduciary responsibilities with his employing agency 
by damaging his professional reputation, by raising legitimate doubts and concerns about his 
honesty and trustworthiness, and by his conviction of a moral turpitude crime. 
3. When his federal indictment came to light, Kentf s supervisor, Don Avery, 
directed Appellant to keep Avery informed regarding his status with the court, including the 
progress of his case. Kent had a responsibility to keep Avery informed about the processing 
of his case given Kent' s fiscal duties (excluding matters involving attorney-client privilege, 
but only intimations of Kentf s probable plea), but he failed to carry out that directive. 
Appellant also professed his innocence to Avery of the forgery charges , but later pled guilty 
through plea bargaining. As a result Averv lost confidence in Kent! s abilitv to perform his 
duties. By his failure to keep Avery informed of his judicial status as directed, and by his 
later plea bargain (openly acknowledging his guilt to fraud), Kent breached the level of 
confidence and trust which the Department! s officials had placed in him. Due to Kent! s 
fiduciary capacity, this breach of confidence and trust constituted aggravated misconduct. 
Therefore, the Department was justified in dismissing Kent in order to advance the good 
of the public interest pursuant to §67-19-18(1). 
4. The Departmentf s Supervisor Handbook lists as a cause for dismissal: "Conviction 
of a crime involving moral turpitude." (Grvt. Exh. 1; Agency Exh. 4.) Appellant, who was 
not a supervisor or manager, had not received a copy of the handbook during his years of 
employment with the Department. Appellant averred that he had no knowledge of these 
professional standards prior to dismissal proceedings (T. 105). Admittedly, this handbook 
does not apply the term "professional standards," but it explicitly sets forth several grounds 
as dismissal for cause, including a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude. Human 
Resource Management Rules (July 1991 edition), at R468-11-1, states in part: 
"Noncompliance with these rules, departmental safety poHcies, professional standards 
adopted by a department, work place policies,... failure to advance the good of the public 
interest shall be cause for disciplinary action." (Emphasis supplied.) This provision of the 
Human Resource Management Rules is applicable to all career service employees, including 
Kent, regardless of whether one has personal knowledge of the rule or not. There are 
certain moral standards, such as integrity, trustworthiness, and honesty, which need not be 
written into an employerf s policies and work place rules. The public employing agency may 
reasonably expect adherence to such unwritten universal moral standards, which if breached, 
would substantially tarnish an employee's reputation and strain if not rupture the 
employment relationship. 
5. It is not relevant that Appellant had not received a copy of the Department' s 
Supervisor Handbook prior to his dismissal. Proper conduct and professional standards 
include certain moral standards that do not need to be explicitly written and disseminated 
to each employee in the public work force. A serious offense in criminal law, such as 
forgery, for one who holds a position such as an Accountant, a Collections Officer, and a 
Field Auditor rises to a level of moral turpitude. The standard of moral turpitude need not 
be written as a specific agency policy, which would include every possible infraction, since 
a reasonable person would understand that such intentional wrongdoing and base 
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impropriety would be destructive of onef s employment relationship. Clearly a universal 
standard of truthfulness,-integrity, trustworthiness, and a reputation not blemished by an act 
or acts of forgery may be expected of one holding the job title of "auditor." Given the 
seriousness of Kentf s wrongdoing and its inherent impropriety, and considering Kentf s job 
duties and responsibilities, the Department did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed 
Appellant for his egregious actions. 
6. Kent claims that because he was an Accountant/Collections Officer at the time 
that he committed acts of forgery during 1985-86 and that by the time of his indictment and 
sentencing in 1991 he was a Field Auditor, he should not be so severely sanctioned as to 
lose his career employment. This argument is not sufficiently persuasive as to mitigate 
Kentf s dismissal. The Department was justified in removing Kent from his position where 
"there is the potential of [his] handling or manipulating trust fund monies.1' (Grvt. Exh. 2.; 
see also Class Specification for Field Auditor 21, Agency Exhts. 5 and 6, respectively.) Nor 
did the Department have an obligation in this instance to place Appellant in a position 
which lacked fiscal responsibilities and had a lower trust level than Field Auditor. 
7. Avery !s Notification of Intent to Discipline listed two reasons for pending 
dismissal: "to advance the good of the public interest" and "noncompliance with 
professional standards adopted by this Department." (Agency Exh. 3.) Administrator 
Astin's December 3, 1991 Disciplinary Decision included two reasons for dismissing Kent: 
his "act of forgery and [his] failure to communicate honestly and openly with [his] supervisor 
has disabled [him] from continued effectiveness as an employee of the Department." 
Clearly, an act of forgery by a Field Auditor falls within the ambit of a crime of moral 
turpitude and would also serve as a basis for just cause under noncompliance with 
professional standards required of a public employee, as well as falling under the standard 
designed to advance of the good of the public interest. The department head also found 
adequate cause for dismissal due to Kent's failure to keep ! supervisor informed 
regarding the processing of Kent's case in court. Appellant had i 'uty or obligation to 
disclose his defense or his plea in court to his employer nor t^ ' ospass upon his own 
Constitutional rights as to his plea, but he did have an obligation u port on the processing 
and status of his case at it proceeded in court, as requested by Aw cry in early May 1991. 
The record contains sufficient evidence of a credible nature to justify Kent' s dismissal based 
upon the broad provision of advancing the good of the public interest and noncompliance 
with inherent professional standards which would eschew any act of forgery or fraud 
involving federal funds. 
8. Anent the Board' s standards of review, we conclude that the record evidence 
meets the substantial evidence requirement of §67-19a-406(2)(c). The decision by 
Department officials to dismiss Appellant was a reasonable exercise of managerial discretion 
given the facts and circumstances of this case. We find no reversible error in the Step 5 
Decisionf s findings of facts and conclusions of law. Those findings and conclusions are 
reasonable and rationale on their face. The CSRB hearing officer concluded properly that 
adequate cause existed to support Kent's dismissal pursuant to R468-11-2. Concededly, 
some agencies in state government may have transferred Kent from his fiduciary 
responsibilities to a ministerial role, such as Interviewer. Other agencies may have imposed 
a sanction of less than termination, such as demotion, suspension, or some combination 
thereof. Reasonable minds may differ as to the reasonableness of a disciplinary penalty. 
We hold that the Department's decision to terminate Kent's employment was neither 
arbitrary, capricious, excessive, an abuse of discretion, nor in violation of merit principles 
in public employment. Essentially, the facts supported the charges against Kent, and the 
charges rise to such a level as to warrant dismissal, if the Department is so disposed. 
9. The CSRB hearing officer gave adequate consideration in her Conclusions of Law 
to the correlation between: the Supervisor Handbook which denoted a conviction of a crime 
of moral turpitude as a "for cause" justification for dismissal, the employer' s expectation 
of "understood" professional conduct as contrasted with private life misbehavior, the time 
period when Kent's illegal actions took place, the nexus between Kent's off-duty 
misconduct and its detrimental relationship to his employment status, the severity of the 
penalty, and the weighing of the evidence and analysis of the parties' respective arguments. 
The fact finder then concluded that the Department had met its burden of substantial 
evidence under §67-19a-406(2)(a). Moreover, the hearing officer observed all of the 
witnesses' demeanor, heard their testimony firsthand, and then assigned levels of 
credibility to both Kent's and Avery's testimony. The Step 5 Decision shows that the 
trier of fact found Kent' s testimony less convincing, and obviously less creditable than 
Avery' s as to whether Kent kept Avery informed about the status of his court case as 
requested (Step 5 Decision, pp. 5-6). 
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MOTION TO REOPEN STEP 5 HEARING AND CROSS-APPEAL 
After adjournment of the Step 5 proceeding and the closing of the record on 
February 7,1991, the Department motioned the CSRB hearing officer to reopen the record 
and the proceeding to take the testimony of Mr. Dean Kimber, former Chief of the 
Contributions Section, who retired in August 1991. According to the Department, the 
purpose of reopening the hearing and taking Kimber fs testimony was to show: 
"Mr. Kimber has denied to [counsel] that [Kent] informed him of the progress of the federal 
prosecution other than at one time shortly after [Kentf s] indictment, when Mr. Kimber 
approached [Kent] about the matter.f(Agencyfs Motion To Reopen Hearing). Following 
briefing by both parties, including a proffered affidavit by Kimber, the Board' s hearing 
officer denied the request to reopen the record. Subsequently, the Department has cross-
appealed on the single issue the hearing officerf s denial of a reopening of the record and 
the taking of rebuttal testimony. 
The Board concludes that because the hearing officer fs Step 5 Decision is affirmed 
below, there is no prejudice to the Department regarding the absence of Kimber' s rebuttal 
testimony. Therefore, it is not necessary to rule on the propriety of whether or not the 
Step 5 proceeding should have been reopened. That matter is mooted by the Board! s 
sustaining the Departmentf s dismissal of Appellant. 
DECISION 
Appellantf s appeal to the Board at Step 6 of the State' s grievance and appeal 
procedures is denied. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS, 
Bruce T, Jones, Chairman 
Jean M. Bishop, Member 
Kathleen Hirabayashi, Member 
Jose L. Trujillo, Member 
DATED this20thday of 0c tober l^92r -^__ ^ 
Briice T. Jones^"^ 7 
Chairman ( J 
Career Service Review Board 
ENDNOTES 
1. R468-11-2 states: "An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause as explained under R468-10-2 and 
11-1 of these rules as follows . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) 
2. Utah Code Annotated, £67-19-18(1) states: 
Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted only to advance the 
good of the public interest, and for just causes such as inefficiency, 
incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels, 
insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. (Emphasis supplied.) 
3. Employee relations literature is replete with authorities' references to the interchangeability of such terms as 
"just cause," "cause," "good cause," "for cause," "adequate cause," etc. See, for example, Lex K. Larson's Unjust 
Dismissal, p. 1-2; Public Employment Discharge and Discipline, (Employment Law Library), p. 3-1; How 
Arbitration Works (3rd ed.) by Elkouri and Elkouri, p. 612; from the American Arbitration Association Robert 
Coulson's Hie Termination Handbook, p. 121. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code 
Unannotated §63-46b-13. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated 
§63-46b-14 and -16. 
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Supervisor's Handbook, Separations, Pages 12-1 through 12-
I. Separations 
XIL SEPARATIONS 
Separations from the Department fall into the following categories: 
Voluntary 
Resignation 
An employee may resign by giving written notice to his or her supervisor, who in turn sends it up 
the line. A resignation will be accepted without prejudice if received 10 working days before its 
effective date. If less notice is given, a letter of this fact may be placed in the employee's personnel file. 
A resignation may be withdrawn on the next working day after its submission. Withdrawal of a 
resignation at a later time may occur only with the consent of the Administrator. 
When an employee submits a letter of resignation, the letter or a copy should be forwarded 
immediately to the Personnel and Training Section, and Form 451 should accompany the letter. 
Any employee who resigns, after giving adequate prior notice, will receive all terminal leave pay 
in the final check, which will be issued on the regular payday after the employee's last working day. 
The Employee Termination Check-Out Sheet (Form 470, Exhibit 14) is to be completed on each 
terminating employee and transmitted to the Personnel section within three (3) days following the 
termination date. As each item of information on the form is considered, it should be filled out, 
initialed off or marked "NA" (not applicable) so that it is clear that nothing has been overlooked. 
Abandonment of Posit ion 
An employee who is absent from work for 3 consecutive days and is capable of giving proper 
notification, but does not inform the supervisor, shall be deemed to have abandoned his/her position. 
The employee shall be informed of the action in writing by their supervisor. A copy of this letter 
should go up the line to the Personnel and Training Section. The employee shall have appeal rights 
within 10 working days of the notice. 
Retirement 
An employee may retire at any time as provided for in the retirement plan they participate in. 
They shall give adequate notice of their plans to retire. 
No employee will be required to retire or be removed from Department service for reasons 
unrelated to work performance. 
Involuntary Separations - Without Prejudice 
Reduction in Force 
State regulations provide that employees may be separated without prejudice because of 
inadequate funds, change of workload, or lack of work. 
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A reduction in force is governed by the Department's work force adjustment plan. A copy of the plan 
will be available to all affected staff when reductions are necessary. 
Retention points shall be calculated on all career employees by the length of continuous State service 
and a job proficiency score. An average of the last three annual performance ratings will be used as a 
proficiency score. When less than three ratings are available the average of those given will be used. Each 
employee's job proficiency score and length of service score shall be added together to produce the 
retention score. 
The order of separation will be first temporary employees (TLNC), second probationary, and third 
tenured employees in order of their retention scores. In cases of a tie, the employee with the least seniority 
shall be released first. 
Employees who are separated due to a reduction in force shall be given written notification of 
separation. They may appeal to the Administrator for review if the appeal is submitted within 10 working 
days from receipt of their written notification. The employee may appeal the Administrator's decision 
according to the appeal procedure of the Career Service Review Board. 
A reinstated rif d employee is not required to serve a probationary period and enjoys the rights and 
privileges of a regular career service employee. 
Dismissals for Cause 
Failure to satisfactorily complete probation period. 
Failure to report to work. 
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. ^ 
Negligence, inefficiency or unfitness to perform duties. 
Violation of Department or State regulations. 
Gross misconduct or insubordination. 
Written notification from the Administrator specifying the reasons for the dismissal, and the effective 
date, must be given the employee. 
The following procedures must be observed in dismissing or demoting employees having career 
service status: 
1. The Administrator or designated representative shall notify the employee in writing of the 
reasons for the dismissal (or demotion). 
2. The employee shall have at least five working days to reply and have the reply considered by the 
Administrator. 
3. The employee shall have the right to be heard by the Administrator or representative. 
4. Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the Administrator finds 
adequate cause or reason. 
5. The Administrator may suspend an employee without pay pending the outcome of dismissal 
proceedings. 
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Recommendations for dismissal or demotion of career status employees should be made by the 
immediate supervisor and sent up the line. All pertinent documents, such as performance evaluations, 
notes relating to previous discussions, notes pertaining to oral reprimands, etc., should accompany the 
recommendations. 
Career status employees have the right to formally appeal suspensions or dismissals. Information 
concerning this procedure is given on page 13-1. A time limited non-career, or probationary employee may 
be dismissed without right of appeal. 
12-3 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss , 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Phillip W. Dyer, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he served BRIEF OF PETITIONER upon the 
following parties by hand-delivering two (2) true and correct 
copies each thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
K. Allan Zabel, Esq. 
Counsel for Agency 
140 East 300 South 
Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
Robert N. White 
Administrator 
Career Service Review Board 
1120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
on the / / day of /^u^L , 1993 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /O day of 
Notary Public 7 7] 
My Coitimissio|^««j^^e«*^^««^^^«••-•-Residing ats // 
I j^gSsih1^ Notary PubBc • C a i r T.^Ve* CmlvA \j TTi-ah 
1 &SS*&^ KATHLEEN J. QILLMAN • ^ - ^ 1 , a j c e L O U ^ r L y / u ' - a n 
\ 318 Keams Building I 
i Salt Lake City, Utah 8f101 ! 
• XkViSSi&jkJ MyCommission Expires I 
. ^ W l ^ W becember23,1995 I - ^ g ^ State of Utah .
